Sigrid Raets, a PhD researcher at the Institute for International Research on Criminal Policy (IRCP) at Ghent University
The last decade has seen efforts to counter violent extremism (CVE) grow to global prominence. Unlike traditional counterterrorism policies, CVE embodies a non-repressive approach to preventing and countering the broader issue of violent extremism. Beyond this generic description, CVE initiatives can vary quite substantially from one country or region to another. In addition, there is considerable variation in the adoption and implementation of CVE policies, both between and within different countries. One of the countries that scores relatively high in terms of the extent of its CVE policy is Belgium.[1] This was not always the case, as CVE efforts were practically non-existent in Belgium before 2015.[2]
Belgium is one of many European countries that has readily jumped on the CVE bandwagon. Yet, despite its dramatic rise in popularity, existing research points out the pressing need to better understand the content and implementation of CVE work. Indeed, while disengagement from violent extremism has become a serious focus of research in recent years, interventions designed to support this process remain “notoriously opaque”.[3] In light of these important knowledge gaps, this article will discuss the key players, guiding principles, and main challenges that currently shape CVE work in Belgium.
Who is doing CVE work in Belgium? Anyone looking into this question will soon find themselves faced with a complex, almost labyrinthine landscape. Because of the overwhelming number of actors, action plans, and initiatives involved, the CVE landscape in Belgium is best described as one big patchwork quilt lacking any grand design or focus. Notwithstanding this complexity, we can identify two settings that stand out as ‘centers of gravity’ in the CVE landscape: local municipalities and prisons.
Across both settings, particular progress has been made in terms of multi-agency collaboration. Unlike other European countries, Belgium does not have a strong multi-agency working tradition and thus could not draw on pre-existing collaborative structures. There is no single-sector solution for a complex problem like violent extremism. Professionals who wish to counter extremism will, therefore, need to collaborate constructively with partner organizations — a need that was made abundantly clear by the “Syria crisis” and its accompanying wave of foreign terrorist fighters.[4]
Multi-agency responses in the context of CVE have since taken many different forms. One of the most prominent examples of CVE-dedicated multi-agency structures in Belgium are the Local Integral Security Cells (LISC). Situated at the local level, LISC are multi-agency platforms tasked primarily with early detection and case management. Their work spans across primary, secondary, and tertiary prevention, making them a major pillar of the CVE field. While LISC platforms have taken on various shapes and sizes in order to respond to local needs, they usually include the mayor, a representative of the local police, and local social services.
One prominent feature of the Belgian CVE landscape is its high degree of institutionalization. Many of the CVE-dedicated institutions and functions that have been installed in Belgium focus on the coordination and implementation of CVE efforts. Actual interventions, on the other hand, are often carried out by regular service providers, such as youth workers, social workers, prison counsellors, or parole officers. In addition, there are only a few non-governmental CVE-dedicated organizations active in Belgium. The few NGOs that have stepped into the CVE arena tend to specialize in ideological counselling, seeing how many regular service providers feel uncomfortable with intervening in this space. Another surprising absentee are former extremists. Compared to other countries,[5] former extremists are very rarely involved in CVE work in Belgium.
More important than the question of who is doing CVE work is the question of what CVE work entails. Given that CVE interventions must contend with highly individualized processes, a one-size-fits-all approach would be neither workable nor appropriate. Instead, efforts in this space are characterized by the adoption of tailor-made, multi-faceted interventions. To make such an individualized approach possible, CVE practice must draw on a broad palette of services and working methods, mixing and matching them on a case-by-case basis.
Even though CVE efforts can be quite diverse, a number of elements tend to recur in most intervention plans. These common areas of intervention are (1) education and employment, which can include educational opportunities, occupational guidance, and job search assistance; (2) lifestyle and leisure, which covers sports, hobbies, creative, or cultural activities; (3) psychological support, which may be offered in the case of mental illness, trauma, or difficulties in coping with the disengagement process; (4) social support, which is usually aimed at restoring ties with family, friends, or significant others, but might also include the counselling of family members themselves; (5) informal support, which involves attentively listening to the concerns, problems, and aspirations of individual beneficiaries as well as helping them with very practical issues such as filling out paperwork; and (6) religion and ideology, which includes any form of belief-based intervention. Of these, informal support appears to be one of the most commonly offered forms of assistance. Belief-based interventions, on the other hand, are more the exception than the rule.
The basic or guiding principle is the same for all six areas of intervention: facilitating positive change by constructing pro-social pillars. The logic is one of diversion. In other words, strengthening alternatives to extremist involvement rather than targeting the involvement itself. However, how a certain intervention is supposed to bring about the desired change is rarely specified. Many CVE interventions lack a well-developed theory of change and instead rely on uncorroborated assumptions, overly simplified models of causation, or even gut instinct. Even though the relationship between theory and practice is never straightforward, this suggests a serious disconnect between what is known in the disengagement and deradicalization literature and what is being implemented in practice.
Crucially, these interventions, carried out under the banner of CVE, bear much more than a passing resemblance to general crime prevention and offender rehabilitation practices. In fact, with the exception of ideological counselling, most CVE efforts draw on basic social work, making CVE close to “business as usual” for regular service providers active in this field.[6] This observation raises an interesting question: are these interventions similar because extremist offenders are simply not that different from general offenders, or might this be a case of Maslow’s hammer: “if the only tool you have is a hammer, it is tempting to treat everything as if it were a nail.[7]
When it comes to the practical reality of doing CVE work, the challenges are many. Firstly, the terminology in this field is notoriously fuzzy. Both within and across different sectors involved in CVE, there is no common understanding of what ‘radical’ or ‘extremist’ means, what counts as a sign of radicalization — or conversely, of success — or when and in which cases it is appropriate to intervene.
A second and related challenge is how to assess change and measure the impact of an intervention. Most often, the intended outcomes associated with CVE interventions are not clearly stated. Moreover, because interventions are highly individualized, the goals of CVE efforts are just as disparate as the individuals they are applied to. Unspecified outcomes, however, make measuring effectiveness rather difficult. Additionally, no hard and fast criteria exist upon which to judge positive change, meaning that assessing individual progress is frequently done in a subjective and unsystematic way. All this implies that, for the moment, evaluation remains a tremendous challenge.
A third challenge relates to trust issues. Trust is undoubtedly a cornerstone of successful intervention. Building trust takes time and requires investing in the relationship between the practitioner and the individual beneficiary. Yet, in the context of CVE, mistrust, us-versus-them attitudes, and suspicion towards authorities are quite commonplace. Likewise, trust can make or break successful collaboration within a multi-agency setting. However, as one can easily imagine, building trust between agencies and professionals from widely different backgrounds and with different specialisms is not always easy.
Fourth, and finally, the delicate balancing act between control and care may be one of the most challenging aspects about this kind of work. CVE generally takes place in a policy context shaped by heavily securitized discourses. The national security implications of CVE work, together with the popular belief that “terrorists are beyond redemption” [8], seem to encourage an overly risk-aversive approach. Importantly, while control and care are not necessarily mutually exclusive, too great an emphasis on security over rehabilitation may ultimately jeopardize both. In addition, some CVE practitioners voice concern not only with respect to the stigmatizing effect of such discourses, but also about “losing track of the profession, and becoming overly concerned with risk”.[9]
The above is not a comprehensive list of challenges, but it does highlight some key issues. For one thing, these challenges clearly illustrate the complexity of CVE and the various difficulties that its implementation entail. For another, they draw attention to the broad set of skills required by frontline practitioners. It is also worth noting that most of these challenges are hardly unique to the case of Belgium, but rather appear to be intrinsic to the practice of CVE.
All in all, Belgium has taken important steps to counter the phenomenon of violent extremism and promote individual disengagement from it. One of the most salient features of CVE efforts à la Belge is the rich variety of actors involved — in many cases professionals with relevant practical experience, but often not specifically trained in CVE work. Another is the broad spectrum of initiatives and interventions deployed. However, given the overall lack of quality standards or a definite strategy, such diversity is not without risks.
To be sure, Belgium has been doing quite a lot in terms of CVE. Whether Belgium is doing the right things, however, is less clear. While the imperative of “doing something” to help people disengage from violent extremism has never been more evident, that something obviously needs to be grounded in sound and solid evidence. The trial-and-error nature of CVE efforts in Belgium mean that even though we have built some experience in this area, there are very few, if any, established best practices. Crucially, we still lack the right tools to assess the impact and efficacy of CVE interventions, and many of these ongoing efforts have not yet been subject to an independent evaluation. Overall, the inconsistencies, uncertainties, and unresolved debates currently surrounding CVE implementation point to an urgent need for further professionalization and standardization.
European Eye on Radicalization aims to publish a diversity of perspectives and as such does not endorse the opinions expressed by contributors. The views expressed in this article represent the author alone.
[1] SHANAAH, Sadi; HEATH-KELLY, Charlotte. What Drives Counter-Extremism? The Extent of P/CVE Policies in the West and Their Structural Correlates. Terrorism and Political Violence, 2022, 1-29.
[2] RENARD, Thomas. 20 years of counter-terrorism in Belgium: explaining change in CT policy-making through the evolution of the Belgian CT doctrine and practice since 2001. 2021. PhD Thesis. Ghent University.
[3] GLAZZARD, Andrew. Violent Extremist Disengagement and Reintegration: A Framework for Planning, Design and Evaluation of Programmatic Interventions. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 2022, 1-20: p. 1.
[4] RENARD, “20 years of counter-terrorism in Belgium”: p. 81.
[5] SCHEWE, Jonatan; KOEHLER, Daniel. When Healing Turns to Activism: Formers and Family Members’ Motivation to Engage in P/CVE. Journal for Deradicalization, 2021, 28: 141-182.
[6] HAUGSTVEDT, Håvard. Trusting the mistrusted: Norwegian social workers’ strategies in preventing radicalization and violent extremism. Journal for Deradicalization, 2019, 19: 149-184: p. 149.
[7] MASLOW, Abraham Harold. The psychology of science: a reconnaissance. 1966: p. 15.
[8] ALTIER, Mary Beth. Criminal or Terrorist?: Fear, Bias, and Public Support for Prisoner Reentry Programs. Terrorism and Political Violence, 2021, 1-22: p. 9.
[9] HAUGSTVEDT, “Trusting the mistrusted”: p. 152.
© 2018 EER - Copyright © European Eye on Radicalization.
© 2018 EER - Copyright © European Eye on Radicalization.